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An Answer to the Question:
“What Is Poststructuralism?”
Bernard E. Harcourt1

Poststructuralism is a style of critical reasoning that focuses on the moment of
slippage in our systems of meaning as a way to identify—right there, in that ambiguous
space—the ethical choices that we make, whether in our writings or in everyday life,
when we overcome the ambiguity and move from indeterminacy to certainty of belief in
an effort to understand, interpret, or shape our social environment. Poststructuralism
concentrates on the moment when we impose meaning in a space that is no longer
characterized by shared social agreement over the structure of meaning. It attempts to
explain how it comes about that we fill those gaps in our knowledge and come to hold as
true what we do believe—and at what distributive cost to society and the contemporary
subject. By so clearly identifying points of slippage, poststructuralism clears the table and
makes plain the significant role of ethical choice—by which I mean decision making that
is guided by beliefs about virtue and the self, not by moral or political principle.
Poststructuralism is, in this sense, a penultimate stage in the emancipation from
that “self-incurred immaturity” that Kant famously identified—in his essay “What is
Enlightenment?”—as “the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance
of another” (Kant 1970:54). In that essay, Kant elaborated the central features of the
Enlightenment, and his essay played a key role in the philosophical discourse of
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This essay was delivered in the Seminar on Law and Political Theory held by Professors Yishai Blank,
Shai Lavi, and Roy Kreitner at Tel Aviv University on December 13, 2006. The seminar participants had
been asked to read excerpts from the book, Language of the Gun (University of Chicago Press 2006);
however, it became clear that the focus of interest was on poststructuralism and its relationship to
modernity, which is what gave birth to this essay. The essay draws heavily on the social theory discussion
in Part II of Language of the Gun. Special thanks to Professors Blank, Lavi, and Kreitner for comments,
discussion, disagreement, and a spectacular seminar.
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modernity.2 I use the term “penultimate” carefully, though, because, I would argue, in
contrast to Judith Butler, who locates poststructuralism in the work of Jacques Derrida
principally (see Butler 1990:158 n.6), that poststructuralism traces to the work of Michel
Foucault and precedes deconstruction—which should more accurately be viewed as the
final stage of modernity.
In her book Gender Trouble, Judith Butler defines poststructuralism in a similar
fashion, despite locating it in Derrida’s writings. Butler identifies poststructuralism as the
rejection of “the claims of totality and universality and the presumption of binary
structural oppositions that implicitly operate to quell the insistent ambiguity and openness
of linguistic and cultural signification” (Butler 1990:40). For Butler, structuralist theory
recognizes the arbitrariness of the sign, but it nevertheless focuses more on the
completeness of the linguistic system at the expense of the moment of difference between
the signifier and the signified. In contrast, Butler suggests, poststructuralism focuses on
the moment of difference. “As a result, the discrepancy between signifier and signified
becomes the operative and limitless différance of language, rendering all referentiality
into a potentially limitless displacement” (Butler 1990:40).
Though I agree with Butler’s interpretation and her focus on the gaps in structure,
I trace poststructuralism instead to Michel Foucault’s break with the structural linguistics
of Claude Lévi-Strauss as reflected in works such as Discipline and Punish and The
History of Sexuality, Volume 1. Let me be even more precise. I locate poststructuralism,
for instance, in this sentence in the first chapter of Discipline and Punish: “by an analysis
of penal leniency as a technique of power, one might understand . . . in what way a
specific mode of subjugation was able to give birth to man as an object of knowledge for
a discourse with a ‘scientific’ status.”3 Or, for instance, in these sentences in The History
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I discuss this in an essay titled “Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Mediations on Punishment” (December
2006; available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=948774). For readings on the discourse of modernity, see
Jürgen Habermas, “Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present: On Foucault’s Lecture on Kant’s What Is
Enlightenment?” in Critique and Power, ed. Michael Kelly (MIT 1994); see generally Jürgen Habermas,
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (MIT 1995).
3
Foucault 1979:24. « En somme, essayer d’étudier la métamorphose des méthodes punitives. . . De sorte
que par l’analyse de la douceur pénale comme technique de pouvoir, on pourrait comprendre à la fois
comment l’homme, l’âme, l’individu normal ou anormal sont venus doubler le crime comme objets de
l’intervention pénale; et de quelle manière un mode spécifique d’assujettissement a pu donner naissance à
l’homme comme objet de savoir pour un discours à statut “scientifique”. (Foucault, Surveiller et punir
1975, 28-29).
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of Sexuality, Volume 1: “The object, in short, is to define the regime of powerknowledge-pleasure that sustains the discourse on human sexuality in our part of the
world. . . .

[T]he essential aim will not be to determine whether these discursive

productions and these effects of power lead one to formulate the truth about sex, or on the
contrary falsehoods designed to conceal that truth, but rather to bring out the ‘will to
knowledge’ that serves as both their support and their instrument.”4
In this essay, I hope to unpack these compound sentences and, in the process,
provide a synoptic answer to the question “What is Poststructuralism?” It has always
struck me as odd that so many contemporary critical theorists are reluctant to offer a
concise answer to that question. The question, after all, is no less simplistic or
embarrassing than the question famously posed in 1784 that prompted the seminal essays
of Kant and Mendelssohn. It seems appropriate, today, to offer an answer to the question
“What is poststructuralism?” with the same degree of clarity and sincerity.
Poststructuralism builds on, but, more importantly, rejects some of the central
tenets of structuralism—from whence it gets its name. For this reason, it is crucial, in
order to understand poststructuralism, to start with Claude Levi-Strauss and the
structuralist enterprise.

Claude Levi-Strauss and the Four Tenets of Structuralism
Structuralism was the rage in Parisian intellectual circles in the 1960s, but its
popularity distorted important differences between the theoretical approaches of the
leading intellectuals labeled as “structuralist” at the time. A famous French cartoon by
Maurice Henry published in La Quinzaine Litteraire in 1967 depicted the four key
thinkers associated, in the public imagination, with structuralism—Roland Barthes,
Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Claude Lévi-Strauss. Of the four, only one was,
strictly speaking, structuralist. That was Claude Lévi-Strauss, the anthropologist in the
group.
Claude Lévi-Strauss built his structural edifice on the basis of the structural
linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, whose lectures on linguistic theory were published
4. « Bref, il s’agit de déterminer, dans son fonctionnement et dans ses raisons d’être, le régime de pouvoirsavoir-plaisir qui soutient chez nous le discours sur la sexualité humaine. (Foucault, La Volonté de savoir
1976, 19)
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posthumously by his students in the now famous Cours de linguistique générale (1916).
In a concise and useful essay titled “Structural Analysis,” Lévi-Strauss summarized the
central tenets of structural linguistics:
First, structural linguistics shifts from the study of conscious linguistic
phenomena to study of their unconscious infrastructure; second, it does
not treat terms as independent entities, taking instead as its basis of
analysis the relations between terms; third, it introduces the concept of
system. . .; finally, structural linguistics aims at discovering general laws,
either by induction “or. . . by logical deduction, which would give them an
absolute character.” (Lévi-Strauss 1967a:31; see also Lévi-Strauss &
Éribon 1988:158)
The second tenet is perhaps the most familiar today, and represents the idea that
meaning in language derives from the relationships of difference and similarity between
terms, and not from the terms themselves. As Ferdinand de Saussure explained, language
is a system of differences, without positive terms; it is a set of relations of difference and
similarity, rather than a set of terms that are differentiated. “In the language itself, there
are only differences,” Saussure emphasized. “Even more important than that is the fact
that, although in general a difference presupposes positive terms between which the
difference holds, in a language there are only differences, and no positive terms.”
(Saussure 1989:118 [166]; see also Pettit 1975:8; Caws 1988:72-73). This fundamental
insight of structural linguistics has had important implications for the social sciences. As
applied to symbolic action, it suggests that the meaning of behaviors cannot be
deciphered in isolation and do not derive their meaning from themselves alone, but rather
from the distinctions and similarities between different meanings. As Lévi-Strauss
explains, “The error of traditional anthropology, like that of traditional linguistics, was to
consider the terms, and not the relations between the terms.” (1967a:45).
This is the heart of linguistic structuralism, and it may be worth stopping here for
a moment to emphasize the point: in order to understand someone speaking a common
language, meaning is derived from the relations between terms and not from the objects
or the words themselves. The meaning of the “desk table” that you are leaning on taking
reading this essay does not derive from the object you are leaning on only or from the
concept alone, but from the relations of difference between that object/concept and other
object/concepts that we call dinner tables, bar tables, coffee tables, book shelves, and
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even graphic tables in books. It is in the relations of difference between these terms and
between these objects that meaning is formed. I will come back to this central point
repeatedly.
The third tenet of structuralism is the idea that the relations of difference and
similarity form a structure or system. As Saussure explained, “A language is a system in
which all the elements fit together, and in which the value of any one element depends on
the simultaneous coexistence of all the others” (1989:113 [159]; see also Caws 1988:72).
One consequence is that, as the structure becomes more apparent, patterns become
evident. As Duncan Kennedy suggests, “the power of structuralist methodology is that it
shows that what at first appears to be an infinitely various, essentially contextual mass of
utterances (parole) is in fact less internally various and less contextual than that
appearance” (Kennedy 1994:343).
The first tenet is that these relations of difference and the overall structure of
relations are second nature. They operate at the level of the unconscious. They are taken
for granted. This tenet is much less controversial than the others and it too has its source
in Saussure, who suggested that language is not produced intentionally and consciously,
but is the work of unconscious mechanisms. As Saussure explained, “people use their
language without conscious reflexion, being largely unaware of the laws which govern it”
(Saussure 1989:72-73 [106]; see generally Pettit 1975:10). Lévi-Strauss endorsed this
notion of the unconscious, referring to the collective nature of culture as being “no more
than the expression, on the level of individual thought and behavior, of certain time and
space modalities of the universal laws which make up the unconscious activity of the
mind” (1967b:64). An essential fact in the social sciences, according to Lévi-Strauss, is
precisely this idea that “the laws of language function at the unconscious level, beyond
the control of the speaking subjects, and we can therefore study them as objective
phenomena, representative in this sense of other social facts” (Lévi-Strauss & Éribon
1988:59).
The fourth basic tenet of structuralism is that structural analysis can help discover
general laws with universal character—this is the most controversial tenet and what really
gives birth, later, to the poststructuralist break and the rejection of such notions of general
laws. But let me not anticipate too much. In Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism especially, there
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is a strong tendency toward both binarism and universalism. Lévi-Strauss’s tendency
toward binarism is reflected well, for instance, in the following passage from The Savage
Mind:
All the levels of classification in fact have a common characteristic:
whichever, in the society under consideration, is put first it must authorize—or
even imply—possible recourse to other levels, formally analogous to the favoured
one and differing from it only in their relative position within a whole system of
reference which operates by means of a pair of contrasts: between general and
particular on the one hand, and nature and culture on the other. (Lévi-Strauss
1966: 135; see also 217)
Lévi-Strauss attempted to derive generally applicable laws not only in the area of
kinship relations, but relating as well to all other social phenomena—including legal
systems. His goal was to relate the structures of kinship to structures of linguistics, and
from there to a wide range of social phenomena. The goal was to find patterns, a structure
that helps understand behavior. “Ethnographic analysis tries to arrive at invariants beyond
the empirical diversity of human societies,” he wrote (Lévi-Strauss 1966:247). These
invariants represent fundamental characteristics of mental processes—of the way we
think, the way we analyze, the way we categorize and relate concepts.
It’s worth noting here that many later structuralists—and scholars heavily
influenced by structuralism—minimize or attenuate this fourth tenet, suggesting that
Levi-Strauss himself was not so naïve as to believe that these structures were in fact
complete and binary and predictive.5 As you’ll see, this is the primary source of
poststructuralist tension—but the seeds of that tension began early and reside right here
in the conflict over this fourth tenet. I think these later structuralists are simply wrong and
that Lévi-Strauss himself was deeply committed, as a social scientist, to the enterprise of
deriving general, universal, and preferably binary laws.

5 Duncan Kennedy and Jack Balkin are good examples. The influence of structuralism on Jack Balkin’s
work is most evident, for instance, in his fascinating article The Crystalline Structure of Legal Argument
(1986);but what is clear from that article is that, though it borrows the binary structural framework, it
explicitly states at crucial junctures that the binary relations are not fixed and do not map onto political
ideology. In other words, they cannot serve as predictive of outcomes. Duncan Kennedy’s writings also,
though heavily influenced by structuralism, especially in the earliest period, resist the idea of fixed
structures and play on the ambiguities of meaning. Kennedy can be interpreted as trying to rehabilitate
Lévi-Strauss from the fourth tenet of structuralism.
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Lévi-Strauss’s project was very ambitious and entirely scientific. His ultimate
goal was to appropriate structural linguistics to understand human thought and action. As
he explains in Language and the Analysis of Social Laws (1967b):
The road will then be open for a comparative structural analysis of
customs, institutions and accepted patterns of behavior. We shall be in a
position to understand basic similarities between forms of social life, such
as language, art, law, and religion, that on the surface seem to differ
greatly. At the same time, we shall have the hope of overcoming the
opposition between the collective nature of culture and its manifestations
in the individual, since the so-called “collective consciousness” would, in
the final analysis, be no more than the expression, on the level of
individual thought and behavior, of certain time and space modalities of
the universal laws which make up the unconscious activity of the mind.
(Lévi-Strauss 1967b:64)
In La Pensée sauvage, one of his most famous texts, Lévi-Strauss set out
precisely to uncover these “universal laws which make up the unconscious activity of the
mind.” He explored there how North and South American native peoples classify plants
and animals, and relate concepts to each other. He attempted to decipher the “untamed”
mind—the ways of thinking of non-Western indigenous peoples. In his analysis, LéviStrauss compared their mode of thinking, as reflected in their legends and myths, with
European scientific modes of thought during the eighteenth through the twentieth
centuries—again, with the scientific aim of discovering general laws.
The turn to structuralism was intended to give us a better purchaseCa more
scientific perspectiveCon human behavior. The goal was to improve our ability to
understand action and predict behavior. The purpose was to decipher necessary patterns.
“Throughout, my intention remains unchanged,” Lévi-Strauss emphasized in The Raw
and the Cooked. “Starting from ethnographic experience, I have always aimed at drawing
up an inventory of mental patterns, to reduce apparently arbitrary data to some kind of
order, and to attain a level at which a kind of necessity becomes apparent, underlying the
illusions of liberty” (Lévi-Strauss 1969:10).

The Radical Nature of Structuralism
It is somewhat easy today not to see how radical structuralism was at the time.
The previous discussion may seem obvious, natural or intuitive to many today—in part
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because, as with most important ideas, we have absorbed today bits and pieces of
structuralism. We have all become, today, a bit structuralist. But you have to understand,
these four tenets were radical at the time and represented a stark departure from the
dominating philosophical approach in Paris in the early 1960s, namely phenomenological
existentialism which had been made popular by Jean-Paul Sartre’s plays and novels and
held a firm grip on the public imagination (at least on the Continent). In order to fully
appreciate the radical nature of structuralism, it is useful here to contrast Lévi-Strauss’
framework to Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophy.
There is a fascinating passage in a little known interview of Sartre by Pierre
Verstraeten in the Revue d’Esthétique in 1965 that reveals the stark difference between
Sartre and Lévi-Strauss. In the interview, Sartre is asked whether he draws a distinction
between signification and the signifiedCcentral terms in Saussurian structural linguistics
that are intended to capture the distinction between concept and object. More specifically,
Sartre is asked: “Do you draw a distinction between signification and the signified?”6
Sartre responds:
Yes, for me the signified is the object. I define my own language, which
may not necessarily be the same as linguists: this “chair,” it is the object,
thus it is the signified; then, there is signification, it is the logical set that
will be constituted by words, the signification of a phrase. If I say “This
table is in front of the window,” I am aiming at a signified that is the table
by significations that are the set of phrases that are constituted, and I
consider me, myself, as the signifier. The signification, that is the noema,
the correlate of the set of vocal elements proffered. (Sartre 1965:311,
emphasis added)7
Sartre’s response is stunning. By identifying with “the signifier,” Sartre boldly
turns the focus of meaning back on the individual subject. The individual subject is the
one who gives meaning. There is no mediation through what structural linguists would
traditionally call the signifier—the socially constructed relations of concepts. For Sartre,

6. « Faites-vous une distinction entre signification et signifié? »
7. « Oui, pour moi le signifié c’est l’objet. Je définis mon langage qui n’est pas nécessairement celui des
linguistes: cette « chaise », c’est l’objet, donc c’est le signifié; ensuite, il y a la signification, c’est
l’ensemble logique qui sera constitué par des mots, la signification d’une phrase. Si je dis « Cette table est
devant la fenêtre », je vise un signifié qui est la table par des significations qui sont l’ensemble des phrases
qui sont constituées, et je me considère moi-même comme le signifiant. La signification, c’est le noème, le
corrélat de l’ensemble des éléments vocaux proférés. » (Emphasis added).
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the actor imposes meaning by himself. The individual actor is the agent who gives
meaning—who decides, who deliberates, who chooses, who acts.
In sharp contrast to structuralism, which begins from the intersubjectivity of
shared meaning, the point of departure for existentialism is the individual meaning
giver—the agent alone. This traces, at least for Sartre, to the very heart of our being as
humans. According to Sartre, what defines our being—as humans—is precisely our
ability to negate our situation, to create nothingness in the heart of our being through our
own acts and interpretations. In contrast to inanimate objects, human subjects have the
ability to negate, to reject, or to alter their own condition by imposing meaning onto the
world (Sartre 1943:56). It is in this sense, Sartre declares in L’Être et le néant, that “Man
is the being through which nothingness comes to the world” (1943:59). It is in the act of
negation that possibilities present themselves. It is through the process of negation that
the subject can seek alternatives to his present condition. The act of negation—of
rejecting our condition—occurs precisely when the individual acts intentionally in pursuit
of his project, and it is what renders the individual truly free. For Sartre, freedom is
precisely the ability to negate a present condition. “Freedom is the human being placing
his past off-sides, and secreting his own nothingness” (1943:64). This is, for Sartre, a
moment of great anxiety—an anxiety that makes us conscious of our freedom. “It is
through anxiety,” Sartre wrote, “that man becomes conscious of his freedom” (1943:64).
The individual subject as meaning giver is at the heart of Sartre’s project:
situations do not give meaning to agents, agents give meaning to situations. And central
to this process of meaning giving, is the act of negation. As Sartre explained:
It is important to invert general opinion and recognize that it is not the
difficulty of a situation or the suffering that it imposes that are the reasons
that we conceive of another state of being where everyone would be better
off; on the contrary, it is on the day that we can conceive of that other state
of being that a new light falls on our troubles and on our suffering and that
we decide that they are insufferable. (Sartre 1943:489)
The

focus

on

subjectivity

and

intentionality

characterizes

Sartre’s

phenomenological gaze. “One has to start from subjectivity,” Sartre emphasized in his
lecture in 1945, L’existentialisme est un humanisme (1958:17):
Our point of departure is in effect the subjectivity of the individual, and
this for strictly philosophical reasons. Not because we are bourgeois, but
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because we want a doctrine based on truth, and not on a set of pretty
theories full of hope but without real foundation. There can be no other
truth, to start with, than this: I think therefore I am. It is here that we find
the absolute truth of conscience finding itself. . . . In other words, for there
to be any truth, there has to be absolute truth; and this one is simple, easy
to attain, accessible to all. It consists in seizing oneself without
intermediary. (1958:64-65)
From this highly subjective perspective, the individual invents himself through his
actions. Simply put, he is nothing more than the actions he takes. He defines his meaning
and he defines himself through the act of giving meaning—acting on those meanings.
“Man is nothing else than what he makes himself,” Sartre famously stated (1958:21-22).
His actions become his project. “Man is nothing else than his project. He exists only
insofar as he realizes himself. He is nothing else than the set of his actions, nothing else
than his life” (1958:55).
From an existential perspective, then, the agent individually gives meaning to his
acts. He does not come into a world that has meaning ex ante. He gives meaning at every
moment. He defines himself at every moment—by his acts and by his signification. The
contrast to structuralism could not be more striking: against the backdrop of the dominant
theoretical approach at the time, structuralism represented a radical break intended to
move social thought into the direction of social science and prediction.

Contrasting Structuralism with Existentialism
In Language of the Gun (2006), I offer an illustration of how a text—specifically,
Sartre’s play Les Mains sales—could be interpreted along both existential and
structuralist lines, as a way to draw the contrast between the two approaches. The central
issue in the play is how to give meaning to an assassination—whether to interpret it as an
act of jealousy or as a political act. I will not rehearse the entire discussion here, but
simply point to the relevant passages.
The existential reading is offered by Sartre himself: Sartre allows the protagonist
of the play, Hugo, to give his own meaning to his murderous act. In the final moments of
Sartre’s play, Hugo reinvents himself and, by committing suicide, puts a political gloss
on the assassination (see Harcourt 2006:117-188). The act of signification is captured
well in this short passage from Sartre’s play:
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Listen: I don’t know why I killed Hoederer but I know why I should have
killed him: because he was engaging in bad politics, because he was lying
to his comrades, and because he risked corrupting the Party. If I had the
courage to fire when I was alone with him in his office, he would be dead
because of that and I could look at myself in the mirror. I am ashamed of
myself because I killed him. . . later. And you, you are asking me to carry
even more shame and say that I killed him for nothing. . . . I have not yet
killed Hoederer. . . Not yet. It is now that I will kill him, and myself with
him (Sartre 1948:247-248)
And in this final act of suicide, Hugo gives meaning to his act of murder. He
intentionally claims the murder as a political act. Hugo’s final act of suicide is the
quintessential free act that propels him out of his bad faith and gives meaning to his
earlier act.
From a structuralist perspective, in contrast, the meaning of Hugo’s final act is not
given by Hugo—or by Sartre, for that matter. It is, instead, given by the structure of
myths and stories within which Les Mains sales fits. The play, in all likelihood, would
fall in a genre of stories about the passage to manhood. It represents one variation of the
myth—one exemplar set in war-torn Europe in the mid-twentieth century—where we can
observe the important relationships between betrayal and faithfulness, and how these
relate to the human subject acting in bad or good faith. On one structuralist reading,
multiple acts of betrayal trigger a loss of bad faith, as if the human subject is shaken out
of his slumber by the pain of betrayal. We could identify, perhaps, three central tropes
that represent vital moments in any coming-of-age myth: political commitment, murder,
and suicide. These elements can be deployed in many different ways depending on the
myth, but are often central to the narrative. A structuralist reading of the play, then, might
discern central building blocks of the myth (murder/suicide), pivotal relations in the plot
structure (betrayal/fidelity), and possible impacts of these relations (bad faith/good faith).
I offer one structuralist interpretation of the play on pages 127 and 128 of
Language of the Gun. It’s an interpretation that builds on the relationship between
betrayal and fidelity, and between good and bad faith. As I suggest, it is in the
contrasts—differences—between these different emotional relations of fidelity and
betrayal and political relations of good and bad faith that a structuralist might make sense
of the play. Lévi-Strauss actually dedicated a series of books to the larger enterprise of
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interpreting myths, beginning with La Pensée sauvage but then writing four volumes
specifically on the “science of mythology” (Lévi-Strauss 1969 [1964]).
According to Lévi-Strauss, there are patterns of similarity and difference within
certain genres of myths—for instance, within the Oedipus myth—despite the apparent
arbitrariness and contingency of any one specific rendition of the myth. Lévi-Strauss’
work attempts to resolve this apparent tension by drawing on structural linguistic writings
and mapping the relations between the basic elements of the myth (Lévi-Strauss
1967d:206-207). It is possible to propose a Lévi-Straussian reading of the play, which
would have four columns, each of which are in a binary relationship to the other
(betrayal/fidelity; good/bad faith) (Harcourt 2006: 127-128). Using these columns, the
structure of the play can be represented in a simple schema of rows and columns. As
Lévi-Strauss explains, “Were we to tell the myth, we would disregard the columns and
read the rows from left to right and from top to bottom. But if we want to understand the
myth, then we will have to disregard one half of the diachronic dimension (top to bottom)
and read from left to right, column after column, each one being considered as a unit”
(Lévi-Strauss 1967d:211).
To the structuralist, then, the phenomenological focus on the individual as
meaning giver, is simply incapable of generating useful findings—scientific findings.
Lévi-Strauss emphasized this in La Pensée sauvage, where he wrote:
He who begins by steeping himself in the allegedly self-evident
truths of introspection never emerges from them. Knowledge of men
sometimes seems easier to those who allow themselves to be caught up in
the snare of personal identity. But they thus shut the door on knowledge of
man. . . Sartre in fact becomes the prisoner of his Cogito: Descartes made
it possible to attain universality, but conditionally on remaining
psychological and individual; by sociologizing the Cogito, Sartre merely
exchanges one prison for another. Each subject’s group and period now
take the place of timeless consciousness. (Lévi-Strauss 1966:249;
1962:329-330)
And so, in Les Mains sales, meaning doesn’t really end with the final suicidal act
of Hugo. The meaning for him perhaps, since he dies at that moment. But not the
meaning for us. For us it may all depend on the other acts that ensue and how they relate
to the larger structure of the narrative. Perhaps Hugo’s body is dumped in the street,
coded in a way that represents jealous revenge. Or perhaps there are other structural
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meanings that infuse the discovery of his body: the victim of a pimp on Hugo’s release
from prison. Those other social meanings may infuse his act with a different
interpretation.
One ironic application of all this involves Jean-Paul Sartre’s own struggle to give
his own play, Les Mains sales, the meaning that he had intended C he, Sartre, as signifier.
Much to his chagrin, Les Mains sales was roundly attacked by Communists and praised
by conservatives. The liberal press, as well as the Communist press, interpreted the play
as anti-communist (the party leader, Hoederer, who was assassinated, was secretary of
the Communist Party). Because of the ambiguous portrayal of the party leader, the play
was often referred to, in newspapers, as “Sartre’s anti-communist play” (McCall 1969:54;
see generally de Beauvoir 1963: 166B169). “For thirty cents and a plate of American
lentils, Jean-Paul Sartre sold whatever was left of his honor and integrity,” a Soviet critic
wrote (de Beauvoir 1963:168).
Sartre vehemently rejected this characterization of his play as anti-communist. “I
still think, subjectively, that is to say as far as what I wrote is concerned,” Sartre
emphasized, “that it is not an anticommunist work but just the opposite, a work of a
fellow-traveler” (Sartre 1976:213). Sartre, however, had a hard time convincing even
sympathetic readers of his intended meaning. “The play’s meaning,” Sartre emphasized,
“does not coincide with Hugo’s fate” (Sartre 1976:219). Sartre did not himself identify
with Hugo, he repeatedly maintained. “I can entirely appreciate Hugo’s attitude, but you
are wrong in thinking that he is an embodiment of myself,” Sartre told a friend and critic.
“Hoederer’s role is myself. Hoederer is the person I should like to be if I were a
revolutionary, so I am Hoederer, if only on a symbolic level” (Sartre 1976:219B220).
“Hoederer’s is the only attitude I think sound,” Sartre repeated in another interview
(Sartre 1976:210). The objective of the play, Sartre emphasized, was not to valorize
Hugo’s final act, but instead to explore “the dialectic necessity within a praxis” (Sartre
1976:217). Sartre explained in an interview:
I have never found Hugo a sympathetic character, and I have never
thought he was in the right as against Hoederer. But I was trying to present
in him the torments of a certain type of youth which, though it is
emotionally inclined to a protest of a kind which is very specifically
communist, does not go as far as joining the party because of its humanist
educational background. I did not want to say whether they were right or

3/21/2007

What Is Poststructuralism?

14

wrong; if I had, my play would have been propagandist. I simply tried to
describe them. But Hoederer’s is the only attitude I think sound. (Sartre
1976:210)
Sartre tried to give this malentendu a positive spin. It reflected, he suggested, the
dogmatism of StalinismC“that is to say,” in his words, “the fact that a critical ‘fellowtraveler’ was not tolerated at that time” (Sartre 1976:215). Any criticism, any opposition
whatsoever, meant betrayal and had to be met with a rewriting of history. “Falsification
of the past was a systematic practice of Stalinism,” Sartre emphasized (Sartre 1976:217).
Sartre nevertheless had great difficulty convincing others of the meaning he wanted to
project onto Hugo’s final act.
“I am Hoederer.” “I consider me, myself, as the signifier.” These are bold
statements indeed. And, of course, they met structural resistance, though Sartre himself
never gave up trying to define the meaning of his own play. In 1952, Sartre prohibited
any further productions of the play in any country in which the local Communist Party
would not agree to the performance (Sartre 1976:210). By that act, he hoped to finally
imprint the meaning he chose—as meaning giver.

After Structuralism: Pierre Bourdieu’s Synthesis
Structuralism flourished in France in the 1960s—in a climate critical of dogmatic
Marxism, and, in particular, Stalinism. Jean-Paul Sartre, many believed, had failed to
offer a convincing account of Stalinism. Structuralism offered such an account.
Politically, it suggested that the larger structure of institutions and discourses form the
functional equivalent of a language that sustains certain practices within a political
community, that acts as a mythical narrative, and that has symbolic efficacy. This
provided a way of understanding how institutions that seemed appalling could
nevertheless gain legitimacy.
Structuralism offered a critique of both dogmatic Marxism and of liberal
institutions in the period leading up to the student protests of May 1968. As Vincent
Descombes explains (in far better jargon):
The semiological theorem of the exteriority of the signifier has
thus a political corollary. The self-styled ‘political ideologies’ of our
societies are, very precisely, myths, and their symbolic efficacy (the trust
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of the faithful, the adherence of the masses) is no guarantee of their
correspondence with the reality which they claim to describe. Lévi-Strauss
is explicit on this point. “Nothing resembles mythological thought more
than political ideology.” A myth is the account of a founding event, of a
privileged episode belonging at once to a certain time (its origin) and to all
time (since festivals are given over to repeating it). (Descombes 1980:107)
Structuralism, in this sense, offered a legitimation story that functioned much like
critical theoryClike the writings of Lukacs, Gramsci, and the early Frankfurt School. For
Lévi-Strauss, Sartre’s philosophy was precisely a specimen of contemporary political
ideology. Lévi-Strauss wrote, in The Savage Mind, that “[Sartre’s] philosophy (like all
the others) affords a first-class ethnographic document, the study of which is essential to
an understanding of the mythology of our own time” (Lévi-Strauss 1966:249 n.*; see also
Lévi-Strauss & Éribon 1988:165).8 Whereas critical theory had been deployed principally
to expose the false-consciousness of the proletariat, though, structuralist theory was used
primarily against Stalinism and dogmatic MarxismCand also against Sartrian
existentialism.9 The result, as Mark Lilla suggests, is that “ [i]n the Paris of the late
Fifties, the cool structuralism of Lévi-Strauss seemed at once more radically democratic
and less naive than the engaged humanism of Sartre” (Lilla 2001:167).10
But structuralism failed to deliver on its promise of scientific predictability.
Though politically attractive at the time, if failed to help social scientists and critical
theorists deploy the structures to anticipate or project future outcomes. Linguistic
8. The ensuing dialogue between Sartre and Lévi-Strauss, though, was short-lived. Sartre did not respond
in writing to Lévi-Strauss’ criticisms, and Lévi-Strauss did not earnestly respond to Sartre’s comments
(Lévi-Strauss & Éribon 1988:164). Though much has been written about the dispute, it did not lead to
further productive exchanges between Sartre and Lévi-Strauss.
9. To be fair to Sartre, I do discuss, in Language of the Gun, Sartre’s attempt to reconcile existentialism
with structuralism—more specifically, dialectical materialism—in his book Critique de la raison
dialectique, as well as Lévi-Strauss’s critique.
10 . In addition, for many young leftists in France during the 1960s, the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss
offered a theoretical avenue that valued other cultures, especially non-Western cultures. Not only did LéviStrauss’ work explicitly reject the idea that primitive societies were in any sense inferior, it also offered a
critique of the universalizing tendencies in Western thought that seemed to serve only imperialist goals. As
Mark Lilla explains, “Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism cast doubt on the universality of any political rights or
values, and also raised suspicions about the ‘man’ who claimed them. Weren’t these concepts simply a
cover for the West’s ethnocentrism, colonialism, and genocide, as Lévi-Strauss charged? And wasn’t
Sartre’s Marxism polluted by the same ideas?” (Lilla 2001:167). By studying non-Western cultures and
praising them, Lévi-Strauss was offering a living example of the value of the Other. “And though LéviStrauss may not have intended it, his writings would soon feed the suspicion among the New Left that grew
up in the Sixties that all the universal ideas to which Europe claimed allegianceCreason, science, progress,
liberal democracyCwere culturally specific weapons fashioned to rob the non-European Other of his
difference” (Lilla 2001:168)K
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structures, for instance, impose some constraints on the way that agents talk, but not
necessarily on what they say. The structures do not necessarily control or determine
behavior. The constraints of language coexist with freedom of individual expression, so
that the patterns that emerge are no more than thatCpatterns. They help make sense of
individual expression, but do not dictate how agents will deploy language.
This deficiency led many to seek different avenues post structuralism. One of the
more successful—or at least interesting—is Pierre Bourdieu’s attempt to synthesize
structuralism and existentialism. Bourdieu’s theoretic approach—what he called “practice
theory”—stressed that, through habituation, agents may internalize the structures that
surround them. They may internalize the binary distinctions that Lévi-Strauss identified
and that then may become part of their habitus—part of their way of understanding the
world and acting within it.
“The social world,” Bourdieu wrote in Outline of a Theory of Practice in 1972,
“may be the object of three modes of theoretical knowledge, each of which implies a set
of (usually tacit) anthropological theses” (1977:3). The first mode of theoretical
knowledge, Bourdieu associated with Jean-Paul Sartre. This mode of knowledge “sets out
to make explicit the truth of primary experience of the social world” (1977:3). The
second mode of theoretical knowledge, Bourdieu called “objectivist” and he associated it
with Claude Lévi-Strauss. This mode focused on the linguistic relations that structure
primary knowledge of the social world.
The third mode of knowledge, Bourdieu attributed to himself: it is a theory of
practice, and it represents a break—though I would suggest, a synthesis as well—from
both existential and structuralist modes of knowledge. Its aim is “to make possible a
science of the dialectical relations between the objective structures to which the
objectivist mode of knowledge gives us access and the structured dispositions within
which those structures are actualized and which tend to reproduce them” (1977:3). It is a
mode of knowledge that treats actors as ensconced within structuresCsemiotic and
materialCthat are internalized and taken for granted, and who navigate these structures
strategically. Actors understand the rules of the game, and play by, manipulate, and
strategize the rules often in a second-hand way. It incorporates both the Lévi-Straussian
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moment of unconscious structures and the Sartrian moment of subjectivity in a theory of
practice that is intended to let us better understand and predict actions.
For Bourdieu, the tension between structuralism and existentialism crystallized
the central problem in contemporary thought—namely, the lack of a theory of human
agency. The thrust of Bourdieu’s intervention was to emphasize how Sartre, but also
Lévi-Strauss, circumvented this main problemCof how practice relates to the explanatory
structures that we are able to discern in our scientific inquiry.
Bourdieu’s work is fascinating and helps understand how structuralism can
translate into an active theory. But our focus today is on “poststructuralism,” and
Bourdieu was no poststructuralist. Post-structuralist, perhaps, in the sense that he
developed one post-structuralist approach that built on structuralism; however, not
“poststructuralist” in the sense in which the term has meaning today. The groundwork,
though, is now posed to turn to “poststructuralism.”

Poststructuralism
In relation to the four basic tenets of structuralism discussed earlier,
poststructuralism builds on the first three tenets, but rejects the fourthCthe idea that we
could discover general laws. It builds on the notion that meanings are derived from
relations of difference, that these are largely subconscious, and that they form a structure.
But it emphasizes the gaps and ambiguities in the structure of meanings. Lévi-Strauss had
said that “starting from ethnographic experience, I have always aimed at drawing up an
inventory of mental patterns, to reduce apparently arbitrary data to some kind of order,
and to attain a level at which a kind of necessity becomes apparent, underlying the
illusions of liberty” (Lévi-Strauss 1970 (1964): 10). This is precisely what poststructuralism rejects.
Poststructuralism resists, then, the fourth tenet: structures of meanings are not
universal, and do not reflect ontological truths about humans or society. Poststructuralists
focus on those gaps and ambiguities in the system of meaning and find meaning there.
The inquiry is, in essence, flipped on its head: the idea is not to find regularity, but
instead to probe what the “discovered regularity” could possibly mean. What does it
mean that we find patterns and closed systems of meaning? How is it that we come to
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believe that the semiotic structure is complete? This is the key move of poststructuralism:
How is it that we come to believe the meaning we impose in order to hide the gaps and
ambiguities?
The central question that poststructuralists pose in their work is precisely how
knowledge becomes possible at any particular time under specific historical conditions.
In Foucault’s words, the question is: “how is it that the human subject turns himself into
an object of possible knowledge, through what forms of rationality, under what historical
conditions, and finally at what price? My question is this one: at what price can the
subject tell the truth about himself?” (Foucault 1983:442).
Foucault’s perspective, in effect, asks a different set of questions than the
structuralists, but derived from the structuralist framework. Foucault is interested in the
history of knowledge and rationality, the history of the subject. How is it possible that
any of these discourses—existentialism, structuralism or practice theory—could be
received as correct, useful, intelligible? How does the process of making a discourse
‘true’ shape the way we, as subjects, judge, think, categorize, desire the other? How is it
that we turn ourselves into objects of study? This is not to suggest, of course, that
discourses do not become ‘true.’ They certainly have. They are true to many of us. But
that is not the issue, for Foucault. The real question is, how is it that they have come to be
seen as true at this particular time?
Post-structuralism and Foucault’s project thus bear a strained relationship to
structuralism—building on parts, but rejecting others. Foucault himself was adamant that
he was not structuralist. “I have never been structuralist,” Foucault exclaimed in
interview (Foucault 1983b:435). In the English preface to The Order of Things, he
explained: “In France, certain half-witted ‘commentators’ persist in labelling me a
‘structuralist’. I have been unable to get it into their tiny minds that I have used none of
the methods, concepts, or key terms that characterize structural analysis. I should be
grateful if a more serious public would free me from a connection that certainly does me
honour, but that I have not deserved” (Foucault 1970:xiv).11

11. Although his structuralist disclaimer is usually what gets the most attention in Foucault’s preface, it is
interesting to note that Foucault expressed an even greater degree of animosity and rejection toward
Sartre’s existential phenomenology. “If there is one approach I do reject, however, it is that (one might call
is, broadly speaking, the phenomenological approach) which gives absolute priority to the observing
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Foucault’s request was, in part, rhetorical. He was, at least in part, trying to assure
himself that his reader would not be prejudiced and would not give his text a facile
treatment. In this sense, he wrote, “it is only too easy to avoid the trouble of analysing
such work by giving it an admittedly impressive-sounding, but inaccurate, label”
(1970:xiv). But as a substantive matter, it is true that even The Order of Things, which is
perhaps Foucault most structuralist book, is not properly structuralist. The purpose of the
work, in line with Foucault’s earlier statements about his central question, is to explore
how certain discourses make themselves persuasive: what is necessary for a certain
discourse to become accepted. Thus, Foucault explained:
I should like to know whether the subjects responsible for scientific
discourse are not determined in their situation, their function, their
perceptive capacity, and their practical possibilities by conditions that
dominate and even overwhelm them. In short, I tried to explore scientific
discourse not from the point of view of the individuals who are speaking,
nor from the point of view of the formal structures of what they are
saying, but from the point of view of the rules that come into play in the
very existence of such discourse: what conditions did Linnaeus (or Petty,
or Arnauld) have to fulfill, not to make his discourse coherent and true in
general, but to give it, at the time when it was written and accepted, value
and practical application as scientific discourseCor, more exactly, as
naturalist, economic, or grammatical discourse? (Foucault 1970:xiv).
To be sure, in The Order of Things, the specific conditions of different periods
take on a structuralist flavor. This is reflected in his project of unearthing what he calls
the “code of knowledge” (1970:ix) or “system” (1970:x) of given periodsCof revealing
what he calls “a positive unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness
of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing its validity and
seeking to diminish its scientific nature” (1970:xi). These are the unconscious, but shared
rules that scientists from different disciplines converge on during a period. These
common rules are a code, a language, an episteme. “It is these rules of formation, which
were never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely differing
theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to reveal, by isolating, as their
specific locus, a level that I have called, somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological”
(1970:xi). And, in a highly self-reflexive move, Foucault recognized that his link to
subject, which attributes a constituent role to an act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all
historicityCwhich, in short, leads to a transcendental consciousness” (Foucault 1970:xiv).
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structuralism was in part brought about by his having to place his own discourse within
contemporary debate. Just as Linnaeus had to fulfill specific conditions to make his
thought intelligible, Foucault also had to deploy certain current discursive practices to
make his research value. “It would hardly behoove me, of all people, to claim that my
discourse is independent of conditions and rules of which I am very largely unaware, and
which determine other work that is being done today” (Foucault 1970:xiv). In other
words, he recognized that his writings too were shaped and framed in part by the
episteme of his epoch, which is in large part a structuralist idea. He was, in this sense,
caught in a structuralist framework.
But, his inquiry was different. His focus was not on the structures in the
discourses, but rather on how scientists had to shape their discourse in any particular
period to make it intelligible. And second, he was resisting the cohesiveness of the
structuralist framework. He focuses on the many “gaps” in the story that define the work,
and help make it an “open site” (1970:xii). His “main concern” was with the many
changes that reorganize, alter, transform the sciences and the codes of knowledge
(1970:xii). He allowed for individual agency and biographies, and expressly stated that
what he set out to do was not to eliminate the subject completely from the history of
science. “I do not wish to deny the validity of intellectual biographies. . .” (xiii). He
emphasized: “It is simply that I wonder whether such descriptions are themselves
enough, whether they do justice to the immense density of scientific discourse, whether
there do not exist, outside their customary boundaries, systems of regularities that have a
decisive role in the history of the sciences” (1970:xiii-xiv, emphasis added).
Foucault posed a different set of questions than the structuralists, and these
questions are what trigger the poststructuralist inquiry: how is it that any one
interpretation becomes convincing and at what price?

The Final Stages of Modernity
Poststructuralism, then, is a type of critical theory that shares with its genus the
aspiration of achieving the kind of knowledge that, as Raymond Geuss explains of critical
theory more generally, “gives agents a kind of knowledge inherently productive of
enlightenment and emancipation” (1981:2). It attempts to do this by helping agents
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realize that their strongly held rational beliefs in certain theories or premises rest on a
leap of faith, which then makes it possible to trace the genealogy of how those agents
took that leap. It does this by focusing on the ambiguities between knowledge and belief
in order to produce enlightenment and emancipation. Once we lift the veil from our eyes
and realize fully that our rational belief in certain theories or premises are no better than
religious faith—that we have taken a leap of faith to arrive at our conclusion—it then
becomes possible to trace the genealogy of how we took that leap. It became possible to
explore how we came to believe what we did believe and at what price. That is precisely
what the great critical thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth century did along the three
principal dimensions of radical thought—power (from Nietzsche to Agamben), economic
production (from Marx and the Frankfurt School to Althusser), and desire (from Freud
through Lacan to Zizek).
In contrast to other forms of critical theory, poststructuralism focuses on the
social distribution of power associated with the construction of knowledge, what has
come to be known as the “power/knowledge” critique: How, exactly, do we come to
believe what we hold as true? How is it, for instance, that we come to believe a progress
narrative of punishment? What institutions and practices shape us to believe in the idea of
the “delinquent”—or, for that matter, in the idea that we could possibly “rehabilitate” or
“correct” that “delinquent”? How have our own disciplinary practices contributed to
shaping our beliefs? And at what cost?
As noted earlier, in her book Gender Trouble, Judith Butler locates poststructuralism in the work of Jacques Derrida (Butler 1990:158 n.6). If, as I suggest, her
definition is right, then why the different location? “Why not in Derrida?” you may ask.
Why do I classify Derrida as a deconstructionist and distinguish deconstruction from
poststructuralism?12 The primary reason, I would argue, is that deconstruction never
embraces the moment of developing an explanation—a complex social theoretic,
historical, and genealogical explanation—for how we come to believe what we do
believe. Foucault does—for instance, when he meticulously explains how we came to
12

For some of the best discussions of deconstruction, see Balkin 1987 through 1998; see also Bernard E.
Harcourt, “Jacques Derrida, Force de loi, et son influence sur the movement Critical Legal Studies aux
Etats-Unis,” in Les grandes oeuvres et grands auteurs juridiques, eds. Jean-Louis Halperin et Olivier
Cayla. Paris: Editions Dalloz (forthcoming 2007).
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believe that it was right to judge the soul of the delinquent, not just the delinquent act, in
Discipline and Punish. Deconstructive practice does not provide explanation, nor does it
analyze the price we pay when we do that—it does not flesh out the distributive
consequences of those ethical choices. It identifies the choice, but stops there.
Deconstruction, in effect, never overcomes the radical moment of ambiguating meaning,
which distinguishes it significantly from poststructuralist work.
One can see this well in a text like Force de loi, the first part of which is a
keynote lecture that Jacques Derrida delivered in October 1989 at a conference titled
“Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice” in New York City. The text is fascinating
and plays on the structural relations between law and justice, but it does not move
significantly past the slippage once it has identified the ethical choice. Relying on a
“pensée” of Pascal, Derrida excavates in Force de loi the basis of a modern critique of
liberal legalism. The “pensée” in question concerns the relationship between justice, law,
and might (la force), and is indeed provocative: “It is important then to bring together
justice and might; and to that end, to make sure that that which is just be strong, and that
which is strong be just” (Derrida 1994:28). This exposes, for Derrida, the mystical
foundation of the authority of law, and enables a modern critique of liberal legalist
ideology (32). The foundation of law, Derrida suggests, is precisely the force required to
first create, inaugurate, or found the law itself. This, Derrida suggests, requires “un appel
à la croyance” (a leap of faith) and thus represents “un coup de force” (32-33); and it
exposes deconstructive possibilities. It makes possible, according to Derrida, the very
possibility of deconstruction (35), which is precisely what leads him, paradoxically, to
assert that “La deconstruction est la justice” (35). What he means by that is that it is
precisely the auto-authorization of law—the moment of the appeal to faith—in law itself
that represents the moment of rupture, of indeterminacy, and of force that makes possible
the critique of liberal legalism and that represents the moment of deconstructive practice.
In typical fashion, it represents a Derridean inversion of the very title of the conference,
“Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice.” It is justice—because it is selfauthorizing—that creates the possibility of critique and thus, the possibility of
deconstruction. Notice here, though, and importantly, that Derrida does not take the
further step—which I associate with poststructuralism—of offering a social theoretic,
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historical, or genealogical account of how we come to take that central leap of faith.
Derrida stops with the identification itself.
In the end, then, poststructuralism should be distinguished from deconstruction,
and represents the penultimate stage of modernity. It is the stage where we began to focus
on the ambiguity in meaning as the central location at the edge of critical reason that
helps identify ethical choice. Derridean construction, I would argue, comes after
poststructuralism and represents the last stage of modernity: no longer willing to offer
thick descriptions of how we come to take our leaps of faith, deconstruction focuses only
on the ethical choice itself. What comes after deconstruction? Perhaps the absolute
acknowledgment of the limits of critical reason and the refusal to take any leap of faith at
all. Perhaps a turn, instead, to randomization.13

13 I stop here and offer this only as a prolegomenon to further reflection on the role of chance and
randomization in a post-modern period. I have made some tentative beginnings along this direction in an
essay titled Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment.
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